Technical Appendix to Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting

4 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2016

See all articles by Lynne Dallas

Lynne Dallas

University of San Diego School of Law

Jordan M. Barry

University of San Diego School of Law

Date Written: March 11, 2016

Abstract

This document is a technical appendix containing supplemental information for the regressions that appear in Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 541 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2625926.

Keywords: time-phased voting, tenure voting, TPV, short-termism, myopia, long-term shareholders, corporate law, dual-class stock, corporate governance, shareholder rights, voting rights, shareholder voting, corporate takeovers, takeovers, takeover defenses, entrenchment, quarterly capitalism, disparate voting

JEL Classification: G34, K22, G38, G32, M14

Suggested Citation

Dallas, Lynne and Barry, Jordan, Technical Appendix to Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting (March 11, 2016). San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 16-215. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2746638

Lynne Dallas

University of San Diego School of Law ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States

Jordan Barry (Contact Author)

University of San Diego School of Law ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States

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