Selection and Incentive Effects of Elections: Evidence from State Supreme Courts

52 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2016

See all articles by Elliott Ash

Elliott Ash

ETH Zürich

W. Bentley MacLeod

Columbia University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: March 2016

Abstract

Using data on state supreme court judges for the years 1947 through 1994, we find that judges selected by nonpartisan elections and judges selected by technocratic merit commissions produce higher-quality work than judges selected by partisan elections. Election-year pressure reduces work output, but only partisan elections reduce work quality. Moving from nonpartisan elections to uncontested elections increases work quality for incumbent judges, while there is no effect on incumbent judge performance when moving from partisan to nonpartisan elections, or when moving from partisan to uncontested elections, consistent with the hypothesis that non-partisan judges have a greater intrinsic value for quality.

Suggested Citation

Ash, Elliott and MacLeod, William Bentley, Selection and Incentive Effects of Elections: Evidence from State Supreme Courts (March 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22071. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747191

Elliott Ash (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich ( email )

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William Bentley MacLeod

Columbia University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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