Skewing the Odds: Taking Risks for Rank-Based Rewards (Online Supplements)

16 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2016

See all articles by Dawei Fang

Dawei Fang

Göteborg University - Center For Finance; Göteborg University - Department of Economics

Thomas H. Noe

University of Oxford - Said Business School; University of Oxford - Balliol College; Bank of Finland; European Corporate Governance Institute

Date Written: January 21, 2016

Abstract

In this document, we demonstrate that the risk-taking contest game studied in "Skewing the odds: Taking risks for rank-based rewards" has no asymmetric equilibria and, hence, the symmetric equilibrium identified there is, in fact, the unique equilibrium.

The paper, "Skewing the odds: Taking risks for rank-based rewards," can be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2747496.

Keywords: contests, risk taking, no asymmetric equilibria

JEL Classification: C72, D81, G11

Suggested Citation

Fang, Dawei and Noe, Thomas H., Skewing the Odds: Taking Risks for Rank-Based Rewards (Online Supplements) (January 21, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2747503

Dawei Fang (Contact Author)

Göteborg University - Center For Finance ( email )

Box 640
Gothenburg, 403 50
Sweden

Göteborg University - Department of Economics ( email )

Sweden

Thomas H. Noe

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

University of Oxford - Balliol College ( email )

Broad St
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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