EU Competition Law in the Regulated Network Industries

Forthcoming in Jonathan Galloway (ed), Intersections of Antitrust: Policy and Regulation (OUP 2016)

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 08/2016

24 Pages Posted: 5 May 2016

Date Written: March 15, 2016

Abstract

This piece considers the interface between EU competition law and the regulation of network industries. The two have been transformed as a result of their interactions. It is difficult to make sense of contemporary EU competition law without taking into account the consequences that the liberalisation process has had on it. Similarly, regulation sees EU competition law as a model and an aspiration. In this sense, the two disciplines can be said to be mutually compatible.

In spite of the compatibility between EU competition law and sector-specific regulation, there is tension between them. The objectives of the two are not identical. Regulation is conceived to undermine the position of the incumbent and to introduce fragmentation. EU competition law, on the other hand, seeks to preserve the competitive constraints to which firms are subject. As a consequence of this tension, the substantive standards in EU competition law may vary to accommodate the features and demands of network industries.

Finally, it appears that EU competition law and sector-specific regulation have a complementary relationship. Sectoral regimes often lack the tools to achieve their objectives. The substantive scope of regulation may be limited, or the range of measures insufficient to address all concerns. EU competition law is a versatile instrument that can remedy some of these gaps. It has proved to be an effective tool to preserve fragmentation in liberalised markets and to manage technological change.

Suggested Citation

Ibáñez Colomo, Pablo, EU Competition Law in the Regulated Network Industries (March 15, 2016). Forthcoming in Jonathan Galloway (ed), Intersections of Antitrust: Policy and Regulation (OUP 2016), LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 08/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2747785

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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