Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

46 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2016

See all articles by Jon H. Fiva

Jon H. Fiva

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics

Daniel M. Smith

Harvard University - Department of Government

Date Written: February 17, 2016

Abstract

There is a growing literature on the phenomenon of dynasties in democracies, with most studies indicating a causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation under candidate-centered electoral systems. In this study, we explore the relationship between the incumbency advantage and dynasties in the party-centered, closed-list proportional representation context of Norway. We use an original data set of all candidates in Norwegian parliamentary elections from 1945-2013, and apply a regression discontinuity design to evaluate both the incumbency advantage and the inherited incumbency advantage. We document that the incumbency advantage exists even in the party-centered environment of Norway. However, although we document a share of dynasties (7 percent) that is comparable to the United States, we find no evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on their formation. This finding suggests some form of internal party organizational network as a mechanism underlying dynastic politics that operates beyond the incumbency advantage.

Keywords: dynasties, incumbency advantage, regression discontinuity, Norway

JEL Classification: D720

Suggested Citation

Fiva, Jon H. and Smith, Daniel M., Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments (February 17, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5757. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747894

Jon H. Fiva (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics ( email )

Oslo
Norway

Daniel M. Smith

Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )

1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/danielmarkhamsmith

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