An Empirical Examination of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium

Posted: 2 Mar 1998  

Richard M. Frankel

Washington University in Saint Louis - Olin Business School

Marilyn F. Johnson

Michigan State University - Department of Accounting & Information Systems

Douglas J. Skinner

The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Date Written: December 1997

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on the characteristics of firms that hold conference calls and on whether these calls provide information to market participants. We find that firms that hold conference calls are larger, more profitable, go to the capital markets more often, and are growing more rapidly than other firms. We also find that conference calls provide information to market participants over and above the information contained in the accompanying press release. We find that trading volume and, to a lesser degree, return variance, are elevated during the time of conference calls and that average trade size is higher during the time of conference calls. We believe that this evidence is important because it suggests that material information is being released during conference calls and that a subset of large investors trade on this information in real time.

Suggested Citation

Frankel, Richard M. and Johnson, Marilyn F. and Skinner, Douglas J., An Empirical Examination of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium (December 1997). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=63590

Richard M. Frankel

Washington University in Saint Louis - Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Marilyn F. Johnson

Michigan State University - Department of Accounting & Information Systems ( email )

270 North Business Complex
East Lansing, MI 48824-1034
United States
517-432-0152 (Phone)
517-432-1101 (Fax)

Douglas J. Skinner (Contact Author)

The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7137 (Phone)

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