Inheritance Game

Yonatan Aumann, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia (Eds.), Fair Division (Dagstuhl Seminar 16232), Dagstuhl Reports, vol. 6, no. 6, p. 19, 2016

1 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2016 Last revised: 18 Dec 2017

See all articles by Mehmet Ismail

Mehmet Ismail

King's College London, Department of Political Economy

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

A couple delegates a person, D, to divide a cake (their inheritance) of unit length among their children, players A and B. Players are in separate rooms and each have half of the cake on the table in front of them. Each chooses (e.g., by cutting) a piece from the cake, [0, 1/2]. The rules are as follows: (1) If some of the players disagree with the rules, nobody will receive anything. The choice 0 expresses disagreement. (2) Otherwise, players receive their own piece. And, if there is some piece left from either player, D will pay each an extra 1 unit of money (as he’d like to taste the cake and convince them to agree with this rule).

Keywords: Elimination of dominated strategies, maximin strategy, Nash equilibrium

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Ismail, Mehmet, Inheritance Game (2016). Yonatan Aumann, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia (Eds.), Fair Division (Dagstuhl Seminar 16232), Dagstuhl Reports, vol. 6, no. 6, p. 19, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748248 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2748248

Mehmet Ismail (Contact Author)

King's College London, Department of Political Economy ( email )

Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mehmetsismail/

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