Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Corporate Governance

The Oxford handbook of Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press, 2013, Chapter 13, pp. 290-307, ISBN 9780199642007

Posted: 5 Apr 2016

See all articles by Christof Beuselinck

Christof Beuselinck

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management

Marc Deloof

University of Antwerp; University of Antwerp - Antwerp Management School

Sophie Manigart

Vlerick Business School; Ghent University

Date Written: May 1, 2013

Abstract

Information serves an important role in the governance process and, despite the presence of disclosure regulations, there are many private and public firms that voluntarily provide more information than required. This chapter considers the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary disclosure at the firm and societal levels. It studies the empirical literature on the connection between a firm’s disclosure policies and its corporate governance, which reveals mixed evidence. The chapter determines that unforeseen events may be important and calls for further studies on disclosure in private firms.

Keywords: voluntary disclosure, information, disclosure regulations, private firms, public firms

Suggested Citation

Beuselinck, Christof and Deloof, Marc and Manigart, Sophie, Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Corporate Governance (May 1, 2013). The Oxford handbook of Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press, 2013, Chapter 13, pp. 290-307, ISBN 9780199642007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2749118

Christof Beuselinck

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management ( email )

3 Rue de la Digue
Office: A321
Puteaux, 92800
France
+33320545892 (Phone)

Marc Deloof

University of Antwerp ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Faculteit TEW
Antwerpen, 2000
Belgium
+32 3 265 41 69 (Phone)
+32 3 265 47 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/marc-deloof/

University of Antwerp - Antwerp Management School ( email )

Boogkeers 5
Antwerp, 2000
Belgium

Sophie Manigart (Contact Author)

Vlerick Business School ( email )

Reep 1
Ghent, BE-9000
Belgium

Ghent University ( email )

Sint-Pietersplein 7
Gent, 9000
Belgium

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