Education Policy and Intergenerational Transfers in Equilibrium

104 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2016

See all articles by Brant Abbott

Brant Abbott

Queen's University - Department of Economics

Giovanni Gallipoli

Vancouver School of Economics, UBC; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Becker Friedman Institute for Economics; Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Costas Meghir

Yale University; Yale University - Cowles Foundation; Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Giovanni L. Violante

New York University, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 18, 2016

Abstract

This paper examines the equilibrium effects of alternative financial aid policies intended to promote college participation. We build an overlapping generations life-cycle, heterogeneous-agent, incomplete-markets model with education, labor supply, and consumption/saving decisions. Driven by both altruism and paternalism, parents make inter vivos transfers to their children. Both cognitive and non-cognitive skills determine the non-pecuniary cost of schooling. Labor supply during college, government grants and loans, as well as private loans, complement parental resources as means of funding college education. We find that the current financial aid system in the U.S. improves welfare, and removing it would reduce GDP by 4-5 percentage points in the long-run. Further expansions of government-sponsored loan limits or grants would have no salient aggregate effects because of substantial crowding-out: every additional dollar of government grants crowds out 30 cents of parental transfers plus an equivalent amount through a reduction in student’s labor supply. However, a small group of high-ability children from poor families, especially girls, would greatly benefit from more generous federal aid.

Keywords: Education, Financial Aid, Intergenerational Transfers, Altruism, Paternalism, Credit Constraints, Equilibrium

JEL Classification: E24, I22, J23, J24

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Brant and Gallipoli, Giovanni and Meghir, Costas and Violante, Giovanni L., Education Policy and Intergenerational Transfers in Equilibrium (March 18, 2016). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1887R. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2750100

Brant Abbott

Queen's University - Department of Economics ( email )

99 University Avenue
Kingston K7L 3N6, Ontario
Canada

Giovanni Gallipoli

Vancouver School of Economics, UBC ( email )

6000 Iona drive
Vancouver, BC BC V6T 1L4
Canada

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

University of Chicago - Becker Friedman Institute for Economics ( email )

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis ( email )

Rimini
Italy

Costas Meghir (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

37 Hillhouse avenue
New Haven, CT CT 06511
United States
+12034323558 (Phone)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) ( email )

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Giovanni L. Violante

New York University, Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-992-9771 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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