The Market for Paid Sick Leave

34 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2016

See all articles by Simen Markussen

Simen Markussen

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Knut Roed

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients' insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services.

Keywords: absenteeism, gatekeeping, competition, role-conflicts

JEL Classification: H55, I11, I18

Suggested Citation

Markussen, Simen and Røed, Knut, The Market for Paid Sick Leave. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9825, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2750308

Simen Markussen (Contact Author)

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

Knut Røed

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
54
Abstract Views
422
rank
440,453
PlumX Metrics