Stock‐Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation

27 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2016

See all articles by Jiawen Liang

Jiawen Liang

National Chengchi University (NCCU) - Department of Accounting

Chen‐Lung Chin

National Chengchi University

Date Written: January-February 2016

Abstract

Stock‐based compensation has been viewed as an important mechanism for tying managers’ wealth to firm performance, and thus alleviating the agency conflict between the shareholders and the managers when ownership is diffused. However, in a concentrated ownership structure, controlling owners are usually the management of the firm; they can engage in self‐dealing activities to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests. Yet, outside investors may anticipate the problem and discount the share price for the entrenchment behaviors they observe. In this study, we investigate how controlling owners trade off the benefits and the costs of using stock‐based compensation. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, our evidence shows that stock‐based compensation is negatively related to the agency problem embedded in a concentrated ownership structure. This relationship is evident among firms with more frequent equity offerings. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that controlling owners consider the negative price effects of stock‐based compensation and trade off these costs with the benefits of expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, particularly when firms seek more external equity capital. Our results hold after controlling for selection bias and share collateral by controlling owners.

Keywords: stock‐based compensation, concentrated ownership, controlling owners and minority shareholders, cash flow rights and voting rights

Suggested Citation

Liang, Jiawen and Chin, Chen Lung, Stock‐Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation (January-February 2016). Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 43, Issue 1-2, pp. 131-157, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752180 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12167

Jiawen Liang (Contact Author)

National Chengchi University (NCCU) - Department of Accounting ( email )

No. 64, Sec 2
Chih-Nan Road
Wenshan, Taipei
Taiwan

Chen Lung Chin

National Chengchi University ( email )

No. 64, Chih-Nan Road
Section 2
Wenshan, Taipei 11623
Taiwan

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