Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: Lessons from U.S. Railroads in the Late 19th Century

80 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2016 Last revised: 24 Sep 2019

See all articles by Daniel P. Gross

Daniel P. Gross

Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 30, 2019

Abstract

Collusion is widely condemned for its negative effects on consumer welfare and market efficiency. In this paper, I show that collusion may also in some cases facilitate the creation of unexpected new sources of value. I bring this possibility into focus through the lens of a historical episode from the 19th century, when colluding railroads in the U.S. South converted 13,000 miles of railroad track to standard gauge over the course of two days in 1886, integrating the South into the national transportation network. Route-level freight traffic data reveal that the gauge change caused a large shift in market share from steamships to railroads, but did not affect total shipments or prices on these routes. Guided by these results, I develop a model of compatibility choice in a collusive market and argue that collusion may have enabled the gauge change to take place as it did, while also tempering the effects on prices and total shipments.

Keywords: Collusion, Standards, Compatibility, Railroads, Trade

JEL Classification: F14, F15, L15, L41, L92, N71

Suggested Citation

Gross, Daniel P., Collusive Investments in Technological Compatibility: Lessons from U.S. Railroads in the Late 19th Century (August 30, 2019). Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 17-044. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752658 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2752658

Daniel P. Gross (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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