Does Oil Hinder Democratic Development? A Time-Series Analysis

33 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2016

See all articles by Kelsey O'Connor

Kelsey O'Connor

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Luisa R. Blanco

Pepperdine University School of Public Policy

Jeffrey B. Nugent

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 23, 2016

Abstract

The resource curse is a topic studied intensively in both economics and political science. Much of the focus is now on whether oil affects democratic institutions. We further the debate through the use of additional measures of democracy and multiple time-series estimation strategies. We find no robust long-run effect of oil rents per capita on Polity, Civil Liberties, or Political Rights. Many comparable studies were restricted to Polity. We also use different country and period samples to respond to the findings that the effects of oil abundance may differ in Latin America, the Middle East, in mature oil producers, or that the effects become significantly negative post-1980. In each case we do not find a significant relationship. Long-run effects are well placed to address this question because they are estimated separately from short-run fluctuations (important given the slow pace of institutional change), and are consistent even in the presence of reverse causality.

Keywords: resource curse, democracy, oil, natural resources, long-run relationships

JEL Classification: O13, P16, H11, P59; O11

Suggested Citation

O'Connor, Kelsey and Blanco, Luisa R. and Nugent, Jeffrey B., Does Oil Hinder Democratic Development? A Time-Series Analysis (March 23, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2753462 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2753462

Kelsey O'Connor (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Luisa R. Blanco

Pepperdine University School of Public Policy ( email )

24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
United States

Jeffrey B. Nugent

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
510-740-2107 (Phone)
510-740-8543 (Fax)

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