Private Sector Bribery and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policies

Posted: 26 Mar 2016 Last revised: 19 Apr 2016

See all articles by Rajeev K. Goel

Rajeev K. Goel

Illinois State University - Department of Economics

Jelena Budak

Institute of Economics, Zagreb

Edo Rajh

Independent

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

This article examines the determinants of private-sector bribes, focusing on the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Using survey data on Croatian firms, results show that, of the different anti-corruption policies (including internal and external policies), firms' internal code of ethics proved to be an effective deterrent. Firms might also be engaging in corruption among themselves to strategically counter perceived bureaucratic power. In other findings, male employees were more likely to engage in private-sector bribery, while firms located in the capital were less likely to do so. Policy implications are discussed.

Suggested Citation

Goel, Rajeev K. and Budak, Jelena and Rajh, Edo, Private Sector Bribery and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policies (2015). Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 22, No. 10, pp.759-766, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754334

Rajeev K. Goel (Contact Author)

Illinois State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Jelena Budak

Institute of Economics, Zagreb ( email )

Croatia

Edo Rajh

Independent ( email )

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