A Replication of Corruption and Elections
Public Finance Review, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 143-154 , 2015
Posted: 26 Mar 2016 Last revised: 19 Apr 2016
Date Written: 2015
Abstract
Using cross-national panel data, Krause and Mendez recently studied whether voters retract support from political candidates who they think are corrupt. Their main finding is that corruption in public office is effectively punished by voters. Given the well-known issues with adequately measuring corruption, this note examines the sensitivity of extant findings to an alternate corruption measure. We fail to find a statistically robust effect of corruption on electoral outcomes.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Goel, Rajeev K. and Mazhar, Ummad, A Replication of Corruption and Elections (2015). Public Finance Review, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 143-154 , 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754339
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.
