Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma: Comparing the Direct and Indirect Approach

50 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2016

See all articles by Leonardo Becchetti

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Germana Corrado

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Management and Law

Vittorio Pelligra

Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics

Fiammetta Rossetti

University of Rome II

Date Written: March 25, 2016

Abstract

We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma by comparing results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The combination of a legality frame plus a conformity information design reduces further the relative preference (satisfaction) for the non-cooperative choice for such players. Our findings support the hypothesis that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design.

Keywords: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, Corruption, Laboratory Experiment, Legality Game, Redistribution, Conformity

JEL Classification: D7, D73, C92, H2

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Corrado, Germana and Pelligra, Vittorio and Rossetti, Fiammetta, Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma: Comparing the Direct and Indirect Approach (March 25, 2016). CEIS Working Paper No. 372. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2754686

Leonardo Becchetti (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Germana Corrado

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Management and Law ( email )

Rome
Italy

Vittorio Pelligra

Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics ( email )

V. S. Ignazio 17
Cagliari 09123, CA 09123
Italy

Fiammetta Rossetti

University of Rome II ( email )

Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy

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