The Strategic Allocation of Inventors to R&D Collaborations

UC3M Working Paper Business Economics Series 16-01

50 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2016 Last revised: 7 Sep 2019

See all articles by Neus Palomeras

Neus Palomeras

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration

David Wehrheim

IESE Business School

Date Written: March 25, 2016

Abstract

In this paper, we suggest that the allocation of inventors can reduce the inherent tension between value creation and value protection a firm faces when engaging in R&D alliances. By considering the inventor's technical fit as a necessary condition for value creation, we analyze the role of the strength of protection of the inventor's set of knowledge in decreasing the threat of misappropriation by partner firms. We rely on patent ownership and inventorship data to analyze the selection of individuals for R&D collaborations in the pharmaceutical industry between 1991 and 2010. Our results suggest that the inventor's strength of knowledge protection is an important determinant in the allocation decision for collaboration, since it contributes to offset leakage risks in the alliance.

Keywords: R&D, Collaboration, Technology Leakage, Co-Patents, Inventors

JEL Classification: J24, L65, O31, O32, O34

Suggested Citation

Palomeras, Neus and Wehrheim, David, The Strategic Allocation of Inventors to R&D Collaborations (March 25, 2016). UC3M Working Paper Business Economics Series 16-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754691 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2754691

Neus Palomeras (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

David Wehrheim

IESE Business School ( email )

Camino Cerro del Ɓguila, 3
Madrid, Madrid 28023
Spain

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