The Incompetence Trap: The (Conditional) Irrelevance of Agency Expertise

Abstract

Formal models of the appointments process typically cast the decision of the appointing executive as one where an open position is assumed and an appointee is chosen in order to maximize the utility of the executive (and perhaps that of the legislature if confirmation is required). However, several — often patronage-focused — processes within the appointments process focus instead on finding acceptable positions for “necessary-to-place” individuals. Here, I develop a model where the goal is to find the best position for such an individual. In contrast to many existing models of the appointments process, I find that when the personnel process is focused on finding the best position for a given person as opposed to finding the best person for a given position, “turkey farms” — agencies that have high numbers of minimally-competent (but necessary-to-place) individuals among their ranks — can result in equilibrium. Moreover, once agency capacity is sufficiently low, incompetent individual appointees no longer have detrimental effects on the utilities of the appointing principals, which further incentivizes the usage of certain agencies as “turkey farms.”

Keywords: executive appointments, formal models, agency competence, bureaucratic appointments, formal models

JEL Classification: D7, D70, D73