Rent-Seeking in Research Markets

The Journal of Technology Transfer, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 103-09

Posted: 6 Apr 2016

See all articles by Rajeev K. Goel

Rajeev K. Goel

Illinois State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

Using a standard model of uncertain innovation, this paper examines research rivalry and rent-seeking rivalry in innovation markets. Previous literature has not considered the implications of rent-seeking in research markets. We find that greater rent-seeking by the rival unambiguously lowers own profit-maximizing research and rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, greater research spending by the rival also lowers own research and rent-seeking, especially when the probability of own innovation is low. Policy implications are discussed

Suggested Citation

Goel, Rajeev K., Rent-Seeking in Research Markets (2003). The Journal of Technology Transfer, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 103-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758949

Rajeev K. Goel (Contact Author)

Illinois State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

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