Class Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions are Essential for Compensation and Deterrence

6 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2016 Last revised: 30 Aug 2016

See all articles by Robert H. Lande

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law

Date Written: March 30, 2016

Abstract

Recent empirical studies demonstrate five reasons why antitrust class action cases are essential: (1) class actions are virtually the only way for most victims of antitrust violations to receive compensation; (2) most successful class actions involve collusion that was anticompetitive; (3) class victims’ compensation has been modest, generally less than their damages; (4) class actions deter significant amounts of collusion and other anticompetitive behavior; and (5) anticompetitive collusion is underdeterred, a problem that would be exacerbated without class actions. Unfortunately, a number of court decisions have undermined class action cases, thus preventing much effective and important antitrust enforcement.

Keywords: Antitrust, class actions, antitrust class actrions, class action cases, damages, antitrust damages, compensation, deterrence, collusion, cartels

Suggested Citation

Lande, Robert H., Class Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions are Essential for Compensation and Deterrence (March 30, 2016). Antitrust Magazine, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2016, University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-12 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2759410

Robert H. Lande (Contact Author)

University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )

1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

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