Corrigendum to 'Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union'

2 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2016

See all articles by Marie-Laure Allain

Marie-Laure Allain

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Department of Economic Sciences

Marcel Boyer

CIRANO, Université de Monréal

Rachidi Kotchoni

Université Paris Nanterre; African Development Bank

Jean Pierre Ponssard

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie

Date Written: April 11, 2016

Abstract

Corrigendum to “Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union.”

The paper “Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union” can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342180.

Keywords: Cartels, Fines, Antitrust Policy

JEL Classification: L13, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Allain, Marie-Laure and Boyer, Marcel and Kotchoni, Rachidi and Ponssard, Jean Pierre, Corrigendum to 'Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union' (April 11, 2016). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 38-47, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2762167

Marie-Laure Allain

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Department of Economic Sciences ( email )

Palaiseau, 91128
France

Marcel Boyer

CIRANO, Université de Monréal ( email )

1400-1130 Sharbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2M8
Canada
514 985-4000 (Phone)
514-985-4039 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/~boyerm

Rachidi Kotchoni (Contact Author)

Université Paris Nanterre ( email )

200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre, Hauts de Seine 92000
France

African Development Bank ( email )

Rue Joseph Anoma
Abidjan, Ivory Coast 01 BP 1387
Ivory Coast (Cote D'ivoire)

Jean Pierre Ponssard

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie ( email )

1 rue Descartes
Paris, 75005
France

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