The Limits of Legal Pluralism

(2015) 24 (2) Griffith Law Review 314-331

Posted: 13 Apr 2016 Last revised: 20 Dec 2017

See all articles by Jonathan Crowe

Jonathan Crowe

University of Southern Queensland - School of Law and Justice

Date Written: April 12, 2015

Abstract

Sionaidh Douglas-Scott's book, Law after Modernity, outlines a sophisticated theory of legal pluralism. The book makes extensive use of artworks and other cultural images to draw out law's social meanings. I explore Douglas-Scott's comments on the relationship between art and law through reference to Michèle Le Doeuff's work on the philosophical imaginary. I then address her views on legal pluralism. Douglas-Scott argues that legal positivism's failure to adequately capture the complexity of contemporary legal orders makes legal pluralism preferable as a descriptive theory of law. However, she distances herself from claims that legal pluralism also offers a normatively desirable view of law, arguing that it needs to be supplemented by a theory of critical legal justice. Douglas-Scott shows a commendable awareness of legal pluralism's descriptive insights and its normative limits, but her account of critical legal justice remains highly tentative. What, then, lies in the unmapped terrain beyond the limits of legal pluralism? I suggest the answer lies in overcoming the central assumption shared by both legal positivism and legal pluralism: the idea of law as a product of human authority.

JEL Classification: K00

Suggested Citation

Crowe, Jonathan, The Limits of Legal Pluralism (April 12, 2015). (2015) 24 (2) Griffith Law Review 314-331, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2763398

Jonathan Crowe (Contact Author)

University of Southern Queensland - School of Law and Justice ( email )

West Street
Toowoomba, Queensland 4350
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://jonathancrowe.org/

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