The Market Economy Investor Principal: Lessons Learned from the Ciudad De La Luz Case

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 12(1), 181–208, 2016

28 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2016

See all articles by Adina Claici

Adina Claici

European Union - Directorate General for Competition

Georges Siotis

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Obhi Chatterjee

European Union - European Commission

Oliver Stehmann

European Union - Directorate General for Competition

Date Written: April 12, 2016

Abstract

This article analyses the principles applied by the European Commission in the state aid case Ciudad de la Luz. We first review how Market Economy Investor Principle (MEIP) has been applied in concrete state aid cases. We then briefly describe the market for large studios as well as the facts pertaining to the Ciudad de la Luz. Based on the information gathered by the European Commission during the investigation, we show how it is possible to make use of financial theory to apply the MEIP in that particular case. Given the level of in-depth economic and financial assessment performed by the Commission and the subsequent endorsement received by the General Court of the EU, this decision is likely to set an important standard for future investigations into the Market Economy Investor Principle.

Keywords: Market Economy Investor Principles, EU, State Aid, Spain

JEL Classification: G11, G32, H42, K21

Suggested Citation

Claici, Adina and Siotis, Georges and Chatterjee, Obhi and Stehmann, Oliver, The Market Economy Investor Principal: Lessons Learned from the Ciudad De La Luz Case (April 12, 2016). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 12(1), 181–208, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2763716

Adina Claici

European Union - Directorate General for Competition ( email )

Place Madou, Madouplein 1
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode/Sint-Joost-ten-Noode
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Georges Siotis (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain
+34 91 624 9312 (Phone)
+34 91 624 9875 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Obhi Chatterjee

European Union - European Commission ( email )

Rue de la Loi 200
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Oliver Stehmann

European Union - Directorate General for Competition ( email )

Place Madou, Madouplein 1
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode/Sint-Joost-ten-Noode
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

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