Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game: Strategic Motives and Action Disclosure

63 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2016 Last revised: 27 May 2019

See all articles by Aidas Masiliūnas

Aidas Masiliūnas

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Global Asia Institute

Date Written: February 11, 2016

Abstract

We study whether coordination failure is more often overcome if players can easily disclose their actions. In an experiment subjects first choose their action and then choose whether to disclose this action to other group members, and disclosure costs are varied between treatments. We find that no group overcomes coordination failure when action disclosure costs are high, but half of the groups do so when the costs are low. Simulations with a belief learning model can predict which groups will overcome coordination failure, but only if it is assumed that players are either farsighted, risk-seeking or pro-social. To distinguish between these explanations we collected additional data on individual preferences and the degree of farsightedness. We find that in the low cost treatment players classified as more farsighted more often deviate from an inefficient convention and disclose this action, while the effect of risk and social preferences is not significant.

Keywords: coordination failure, learning, strategic teaching, information, collective action, critical mass

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D83

Suggested Citation

Masiliūnas, Aidas, Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game: Strategic Motives and Action Disclosure (February 11, 2016). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 139, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2764144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2764144

Aidas Masiliūnas (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Global Asia Institute ( email )

10 Lower Kent Ridge Road
Block S17 #03-01
Singapore
Singapore

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
278
PlumX Metrics