Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey

62 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2001

See all articles by Wayne R. Guay

Wayne R. Guay

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

John E. Core

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

David F. Larcker

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 9, 2002

Abstract

Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and governmental regulators. Similar to much of the corporate finance and corporate governance literature, research on stock-based compensation and incentives has generated not only useful insights, but also has produced many contradictory findings. However, not surprisingly, many fundamental questions remain to be answered. In this survey, we synthesize the broad literature on equity compensation and executive incentives, and highlight topics that seem especially appropriate for future research.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Stock options; Equity incentives; Corporate governance

JEL Classification: G32, G34, J33, M41

Suggested Citation

Guay, Wayne R. and Core, John E. and Larcker, David F., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (January 9, 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=276425 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.276425

Wayne R. Guay (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
1329 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-7775 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

John E. Core

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

David F. Larcker

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-6159 (Phone)

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