Strategic Hiring Behavior in Empirical Matching Functions

18 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2001

See all articles by Rene Fahr

Rene Fahr

University of Paderborn; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Uwe Sunde

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Date Written: June 2001

Abstract

This paper makes two contributions to the empirical matching literature. First, a recent study by Anderson and Burgess (2000) testing for endogenous competition among job seekers in a matching frame-work, is replicated with a richer and more accurate data set for Germany. Their results are confirmed and found to be surprisingly robust. Second, the matching framework is augmented by endogenous strategic hiring behavior on the side of vacancy-posting firms. Neglecting job competition, the relevance of strategic hiring is shown using the same empirical strategy. At the same time, the test is shown to be invalid if both types of endogenous behavior are present.

Keywords: Matching Models, Job Search, Vacancies, Unemployment, Job Competition, Strategic Hiring

JEL Classification: J41, J64

Suggested Citation

Fahr, Rene and Sunde, Uwe, Strategic Hiring Behavior in Empirical Matching Functions (June 2001). IZA Discussion Paper No. 320. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=276509

Rene Fahr (Contact Author)

University of Paderborn ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
D-33098 Paderborn
Germany
+49 5251 60 3692 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.quantitative-cg.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
+49 228 38 94 0 (Phone)
+49 228 38 94 510 (Fax)

Uwe Sunde

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, Bavaria 80539
Germany

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