A Product Market Theory of Worker in Training

34 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2001

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Armin Schmutzler

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: February 6, 2004

Abstract

We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each others' trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If competition is sufficiently soft and trained workers are substitutes, firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trained workers. Government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into a focal equilibrium.

Keywords: General Training, Human Capital, Oligopoly, Turnover

JEL Classification: D42, L22, L43, L92

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans and Schmutzler, Armin, A Product Market Theory of Worker in Training (February 6, 2004). IZA Discussion Paper No. 327. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=276517

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Armin Schmutzler

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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