Public vs. Secret Reserve Prices in Auctions: Evidence from Combining Field and Lab Experiments

29 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016 Last revised: 10 Jun 2016

See all articles by David M. Grether

David M. Grether

California Institute of Technology

David Porter

Chapman University - Department of Business and Economics

Matthew Shum

California Institute of Technology

Date Written: April 18, 2016

Abstract

In this paper, we report both field and laboratory experimental results on the effects of setting public versus private reserve prices in ascending auctions. The field experiments were performed with a large online used automobile seller. In addition to providing a check on the results of the field experiment, we use laboratory experiments to implement an important treatment that we could not use in our field experiments.

We find no evidence in the field or in the lab of an effect of reserve price presentation on auction revenues.

Keywords: auctions, reserve prices, field experiments, combining field and laboratory experiments, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C93, C91, D44

Suggested Citation

Grether, David M. and Porter, David and Shum, Matthew, Public vs. Secret Reserve Prices in Auctions: Evidence from Combining Field and Lab Experiments (April 18, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2766571 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2766571

David M. Grether

California Institute of Technology ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

David Porter

Chapman University - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

Orange, CA
United States
(714) 997-6915 (Phone)
(714) 628-2881 (Fax)

Matthew Shum (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

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