Bargaining and News

American Economic Review, Vol. 110 No. 2 February 2020

59 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016 Last revised: 30 Mar 2021

See all articles by Brendan Daley

Brendan Daley

Johns Hopkins University

Brett Green

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Date Written: August 26, 2019

Abstract

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller’s type from “news.” We show that the buyer’s ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In fact, the buyer gains nothing from the ability to negotiate a better price despite the fact that a negotiation must take place in equilibrium. During the negotiation, the buyer engages in a form of costly “experimentation” by making offers that are sure to earn her negative payoffs if accepted, but speed up learning and improve her continuation payoff if rejected. We investigate the effects of market power by comparing our results to a setting with competitive buyers. Both efficiency and the seller’s payoff can decrease by introducing competition among buyers.

Keywords: Bargaining, Private Information, Learning, Dynamics

JEL Classification: C78, C73, D83

Suggested Citation

Daley, Brendan and Green, Brett, Bargaining and News (August 26, 2019). American Economic Review, Vol. 110 No. 2 February 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2767147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2767147

Brendan Daley

Johns Hopkins University ( email )

Baltimore, MD 20036-1984
United States

Brett Green (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

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