The Value of Incumbency in Heterogeneous Platforms

51 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2016

See all articles by Gary Biglaiser

Gary Biglaiser

University of North Carolina

Jacques Cremer

Toulouse School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 24, 2016

Abstract

We study the dynamics of competition in a model with network effects, an incumbent and entry. We propose a new way of representing the strategic advantages of incumbency in a static model. We then embed this static analysis in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. We completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with two platforms will emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the profits of the incumbent when there is only one platform at equilibrium.

Keywords: network effect, network externalities, platforms

JEL Classification: L860

Suggested Citation

Biglaiser, Gary and Cremer, Jacques, The Value of Incumbency in Heterogeneous Platforms (March 24, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5829, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2767377

Gary Biglaiser

University of North Carolina ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States
919-966-4884 (Phone)
919-966-4986 (Fax)

Jacques Cremer (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

1 Esplanade de l'Université
Toulouse Cedex 06, 31080
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
66
Abstract Views
442
rank
399,348
PlumX Metrics