Appropriability and the European Commission's Android Investigation

40 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2016 Last revised: 10 Aug 2016

See all articles by Dirk Auer

Dirk Auer

International Center for Law & Economics; University of Liege, School of Law, Students

Date Written: April 20, 2016

Abstract

This paper seeks to ascertain whether Google’s Android licensing terms, which are currently under scrutiny from the European Commission, should be absolved of antitrust sanctions because they increase its incentives to innovate. The paper starts by analyzing Google’s business model with regard to its Android OS. It then identifies the Commission’s main concerns. To assess Google’s behavior, the paper puts forward a framework which hinges on the concept of “appropriability”, and which antitrust authorities could use to balance ex ante incentives to innovate against the benefits from ex post competition. The paper argues that Google is simply pursuing a sensible appropriation strategy which could justify some immunity from antitrust intervention.

Keywords: Antitrust; Competition law; Innovation defense; Appropriability; Innovation

Suggested Citation

Auer, Dirk, Appropriability and the European Commission's Android Investigation (April 20, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2767452 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2767452

Dirk Auer (Contact Author)

International Center for Law & Economics ( email )

5005 SW Meadows Rd.
Suite 300
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://laweconcenter.org/author/dirkauer/

University of Liege, School of Law, Students ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

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