Third-Party Manipulation of Conflict: An Experiment

40 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2016 Last revised: 22 Mar 2017

See all articles by Piotr Evdokimov

Piotr Evdokimov

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica

Umberto Garfagnini

University of Surrey - School of Economics

Date Written: March 21, 2017

Abstract

We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely unaffected by the third party's incentives. We argue that our results are consistent with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.

Keywords: Third-party communication, experiment, conflict game

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D82

Suggested Citation

Evdokimov, Piotr and Garfagnini, Umberto, Third-Party Manipulation of Conflict: An Experiment (March 21, 2017). Experimental Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2768609 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2768609

Piotr Evdokimov

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica ( email )

Av. Camino a Santa Teresa #930
Col. Heroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 10370
Mexico

Umberto Garfagnini (Contact Author)

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford
Guildford, Surrey GU2 5XH
United Kingdom

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