Corporate Governance and Takeover Outcomes

11 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2016

See all articles by Nihat Aktas

Nihat Aktas

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Ettore Croci

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan

Serif Aziz Simsir

Sabanci University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2016

Abstract

Manuscript type. Review.

Research Question/Issue. This article reviews how and through which channels corporate governance shapes takeover outcomes.

Research Findings. We summarize the main findings of the empirical literature that investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on takeover outcomes. The internal and external governance mechanisms that we consider are: the board of directors, the takeover market, blockholders, financial markets in general, product market competition, and the labor market.

Theoretical/Academic Implications. This article adopts an agency perspective of the firm and reviews the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature through the lens of corporate governance. We highlight how the different corporate governance mechanisms affect the takeover process and outcomes.

Practitioner/Policy Implications. The article systematizes the current state of the research linking corporate governance and takeovers. In doing so, we emphasize which mechanisms policymakers can use to improve the efficiency of the takeover market. Alternatively, the review also offers indications concerning mechanisms that could be used to mitigate agency conflicts and, as such, increase firm value.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Takeover, Board of Directors, Blockholder, Product Market Competition

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat and Croci, Ettore and Simsir, Serif Aziz, Corporate Governance and Takeover Outcomes (May 2016). Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 24, Issue 3, pp. 242-252, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2769039 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12116

Nihat Aktas (Contact Author)

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

Ettore Croci

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan ( email )

Largo Gemelli, 1
Via Necchi 9
Milan, MI 20123
Italy

Serif Aziz Simsir

Sabanci University ( email )

School of Management
Istanbul, Orhanli, 34956 Tuzla
Turkey

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