Mark-Ups, Entry Regulation and Trade: Does Country Size Matter?

40 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2001

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Hiau Looi Kee

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Marcelo Olarreaga

University of Geneva; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2001

Abstract

Actual and potential competition is a powerful source of discipline on the pricing behavior of firms with market power. A simple model is developed that shows that the effects of import competition and domestic entry regulation on industry price-cost markups depend on country size. Barriers to domestic entry are predicted to have stronger anti-competitive effects in large countries, whereas the impact of barriers to foreign entry (i.e., imports) should be stronger in small countries. Following estimation of markups for manufacturing sectors in 41 developed and developing countries, these hypotheses are tested and cannot be rejected by the data. For example, although Italy and Indonesia impose the same number of regulations on entry of new firms, their impact on manufacturing markups is 20 percent higher in Italy due to its larger size. Similarly, Chile and Zimbabwe have the same import penetration ratio, but the market discipline effect of imports on markups is 13 percent higher in Zimbabwe due to its smaller size.

Keywords: Entry regulation, import penetration, industry markup, country size

JEL Classification: F12, F13, L11, L40

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Kee, Hiau Looi and Olarreaga, Marcelo, Mark-Ups, Entry Regulation and Trade: Does Country Size Matter? (July 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=276906

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

via Boccaccio 121
Florence, Florence 50133
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Economic Research Forum (ERF) ( email )

21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly St.
(P.O. Box: 12311)
Dokki, Cairo
Egypt

Hiau Looi Kee

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-4155 (Phone)
202-522-1159 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/hkee

Marcelo Olarreaga

University of Geneva ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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