Patterns of Rebellion in Multi-Ethnic States: How Pre-War Elite Ties Drive Insurgent Mobilization

Abstract

What happens to the political goals and strategies of groups in multiethnic states when centralized political order breaks down? Why do some groups respond to internal conflict and anarchy by mobilizing armed fighters to capture power in the capital city, while others seek only to shield themselves from predation and build local-level political order? In this paper I argue that differences in the way sub-national groups mobilize under conditions of political disorder are explained by variation in the skills, networks and personal motivations of group leaders, which in turn are strongly shaped by groups’ prior participation in pre-war central governments. Highly connected leaders are able to translate networks and resources acquired during their government tenure into mobilization capacity against the center, and are more likely to be socialized into seeing themselves and their group as legitimate contenders for central state power. Elites who lack close pre-war connections to the central government, by contrast, even when they control a similar stock of men and guns, are more likely to prefer survival strategies that emphasize restraint and operations within a limited territorial sphere of influence. I illustrate and test this argument using cross-group and within-group comparisons of several sub-national groups in the Central African Republic (CAR), and quantitative analysis of a larger sample of ethnic groups in thirteen African civil wars.