CBA at the PTO

35 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2016 Last revised: 2 Dec 2016

See all articles by Jonathan S. Masur

Jonathan S. Masur

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: April 25, 2016

Abstract

What are the costs and benefits of patent laws? While Congress and the courts are often able to evade this difficult question, there is one institutional actor that is not only well-advised but also required to consider costs and benefits: the Patent and Trademark Office, which — as an administrative agency — is required by executive order to conduct cost-benefit analysis of all economically significant regulations. Yet the agency’s efforts have been less than satisfactory. In its cost-benefit analysis, the PTO overlooks crucial functional considerations, misunderstands basic precepts of patent economics, and resists quantification when quantification is required. In combination, these shortcomings suggest that the PTO has not correctly measured the social costs and benefits of the rules it creates, in part because it has adopted an overly limited view of the welfare effects of intellectual property and the agency’s own role in promoting or discouraging IP. In other instances, the PTO has promulgated rules that will likely have tremendous economic significance without recognizing their importance or conducting a cost-benefit analysis. These errors cast doubt on whether the PTO’s regulations will increase or diminish social welfare. Before the PTO is granted any additional substantive authority, reform will be necessary.

Keywords: cost-benefit analysis, cba, patents, patent law, patent fees, filing fees, PTO, USPTO, Patent and Trademark Office, IPR, PGR, CBM, inter partes review, broadest reasonable interpretation, BRI

Suggested Citation

Masur, Jonathan S., CBA at the PTO (April 25, 2016). Duke Law Journal, Vol. 65, p. 1701 (2016); University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 760; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 577. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2770116

Jonathan S. Masur (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773.702.5188 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/masur/

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