Double Round-Robin Tournaments

16 Pages Posted: 7 May 2016

See all articles by Francesco De Sinopoli

Francesco De Sinopoli

University of Verona - Department of Economics

Claudia Meroni

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM)

Carlos Pimienta

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Date Written: April 20, 2016

Abstract

A tournament is a simultaneous n-player game that is built on a two-player game g. We generalize Arad and Rubinstein’s model assuming that every player meets each of his opponents twice to play a (possibly) asymmetric game g in alternating roles (using sports terminology, once "at home" and once "away"). The winner of the tournament is the player who attains the highest total score, which is given by the sum of the payoffs that he gets in all the matches he plays. We explore the relationship between the equilibria of the tournament and the equilibria of the game g. We prove that limit points of equilibria of tournaments as the number of players goes to infinity are equilibria of g. Such a refinement criterion is satisfied by strict equilibria. Being able to analyze arbitrary two-player games allows us to study meaningful economic applications that are not symmetric, such as the ultimatum game.

Keywords: tournaments, asymmetric games, ultimatum game, double round-robin

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D70

Suggested Citation

De Sinopoli, Francesco and Meroni, Claudia and Pimienta, Carlos, Double Round-Robin Tournaments (April 20, 2016). UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2016-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2770217 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2770217

Francesco De Sinopoli

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

Claudia Meroni

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM) ( email )

Via Conservatorio, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

Carlos Pimienta (Contact Author)

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

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