Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed

72 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2016 Last revised: 3 Sep 2021

See all articles by Kevin S. Haeberle

Kevin S. Haeberle

William & Mary Law School

M. Todd Henderson

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: April 26, 2016

Abstract

To some, the reductions in information asymmetry provided by the main
securities-specific disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws help ordinary
investors in meaningful ways. To others, whatever their larger social value,
such reductions do little, if anything for these investors. For decades, these
two sides of this investor-protection divide have mostly talked past each other.

This Article builds on economic theory to reveal something striking: The
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws
likely impose a long-overlooked cost on buy-and-hold ordinary investors.
More specifically, I explain why there is much reason to believe that the
reductions take away investment return from these investors, while
providing them with only limited benefits. Thus, the article presents a
serious challenge to conventional wisdom on information asymmetry and
the protection of ordinary investors, and argues in favor of a shift in
investor-protection efforts away from the main securities laws and to areas
of regulation that have received relatively little attention to date.

Suggested Citation

Haeberle, Kevin S. and Henderson, M. Todd, Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed (April 26, 2016). Cornell Law Review, Vol. 101, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2770739 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2770739

Kevin S. Haeberle (Contact Author)

William & Mary Law School ( email )

613 South Henry St
Williamsburg, VA 23185
United States

M. Todd Henderson

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-4168 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
291
Abstract Views
1,584
rank
131,111
PlumX Metrics