Executive Compensation

Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Spring 2016

66 Pages Posted: 1 May 2016

See all articles by Moritz Reinhard

Moritz Reinhard

Goethe University Frankfurt, Students

Daniel Velázquez Escobar

University of Pennsylvania, Law School, Students

Date Written: April 1, 2016

Abstract

Inefficient and excessive executive compensation arrangements departing from shareholder value creation have been common in many companies and in some cases have been an element triggering corporate scandals. From a corporate governance perspective we will go through the history, the structure and the legal framework of executive compensation in the US and Germany. The objective is to analyze the US disclosure and independence regulatory approach and review managers pay standpoint, as well as its future and compare it with the German approach. Hence, we will analyze the factors that have shaped executive compensation in both countries. At this point there are still risks and difficulties that market participants and the regulators will need to be overcome to discipline harmful compensation practices. In the joint section we conclude that the regulatory measures that Germany and the US have taken, have allowed differences in compensation amounts.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, Comparative Research Paper

Suggested Citation

Reinhard, Moritz and Velázquez Escobar, Daniel, Executive Compensation (April 1, 2016). Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Spring 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2771266

Moritz Reinhard

Goethe University Frankfurt, Students ( email )

Frankfurt
Germany

Daniel Velázquez Escobar (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania, Law School, Students ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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