Control Mechanisms for CRM Systems and Competition Law

25 Pages Posted: 11 May 2016

See all articles by Reto Hilty

Reto Hilty

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; University of Zurich; Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Tao Li

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Date Written: April 29, 2016

Abstract

There are basically two different mechanisms to control collective management organizations (CMOs), namely the general competition-law approach and the sector-specific regulation approach. This chapter explains the features of copyright management (CRM) systems in general and discusses up- and downsides of both approaches. In conclusion it suggests a primary focus on sector-specific regulation. This approach not only takes into account the particularities of two-sided markets in which CMOs act as intermediaries, but also allows the balancing of non-economic values and interests which are among the objectives of CMOs. Sector-specific regulation is further capable of addressing governance issues of CMOs; above all, it promotes transparency for both right holders and users by providing ex ante guidance. General competition law, in contrast, applies ex post and is particularly likely to become a last resort to control CMOs.

Keywords: collective management organizations (CMOs), copyright management (CRM), collecting societies and competition law, sector-specific control mechanisms, EU Directive 2014/26

Suggested Citation

Hilty, Reto and Li, Tao, Control Mechanisms for CRM Systems and Competition Law (April 29, 2016). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 16-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2772482

Reto Hilty (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

University of Zurich

Rämistrasse 74/7
Zürich, CH-8001
Switzerland

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Munich, 80539
Germany

Tao Li

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

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