Who Gets Hired? The Importance of Finding an Open Slot

46 Pages Posted: 2 May 2016 Last revised: 17 Apr 2019

See all articles by Edward P. Lazear

Edward P. Lazear

Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Kathryn L. Shaw

Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christopher Stanton

Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2016

Abstract

A model of hiring into posted job slots suggests hiring is based on comparative advantage: being hired depends not only on one’s own skill but also on the skills of other applicants. The model has numerous implications. First, bumping of applicants occurs when one job-seeker is slotted into a lower paying job by another applicant who is more skilled. Second, less able workers are more likely to be unemployed because they are bumped. Third, vacancies are higher for harder to fill skilled jobs. Fourth, some workers are over-qualified for their jobs whereas others are under-qualified. These implications are borne out using four different data sets.

Suggested Citation

Lazear, Edward P. and Shaw, Kathryn L. and Stanton, Christopher, Who Gets Hired? The Importance of Finding an Open Slot (April 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22202. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773432

Edward P. Lazear (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Kathryn L. Shaw

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
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United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Christopher Stanton

Harvard Business School ( email )

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Boston, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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