Independent Directors and Favoritism: When Multiple Board Affiliations Prevail in Mutual Fund Families

Financial Management (Forthcoming)

79 Pages Posted: 3 May 2016

See all articles by Christine W. Lai

Christine W. Lai

National Taiwan Normal University

Date Written: February 27, 2016

Abstract

We examine whether independent directors with multiple board affiliations (IDMAs) trade off the interests of one fund relative to another (fund favoritism) or whether they benefit fund shareholders by increasing the level of the board’s expertise. Using a sample of mutual funds affiliated with the top 55 fund sponsors from 2002-2008, we find that the presence of IDMAs is negatively related to performance/resource shifting across funds within fund families. IDMAs appear to decrease fund fees, increase the return gap associated with the unobserved actions of fund managers, and facilitate the transfer of information across funds in a fund family.

Keywords: mutual fund, independent directors, multiple board affiliations, fund favoritism

JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14

Suggested Citation

Lai, Christine W., Independent Directors and Favoritism: When Multiple Board Affiliations Prevail in Mutual Fund Families (February 27, 2016). Financial Management (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773544

Christine W. Lai (Contact Author)

National Taiwan Normal University ( email )

162, Hoping East Road, sec. 1
Taipei 106
Taiwan

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
44
Abstract Views
478
PlumX Metrics