공공투자사업의 입·낙찰 분석 (Analysis on Procurement Auction System in Public Procurement Service)

KDI Journal of Economic Policy 2010, 32(2) 144-170

28 Pages Posted: 11 May 2016

See all articles by Jungwook Kim

Jungwook Kim

Korea Development Institute (KDI)

Date Written: June 30, 2010

Abstract

Korean Abstract: 공공투자사업에서는 최저가낙찰제, 턴키제도, 대안입찰제 등 다양한 방식이 사용되고 있다. 최근 가격경쟁을 통한 효율성 제고를 주목적으로 하는 최저가낙찰제가 확대되어 시행되고 있다. 본 논문은 우리나라 입․낙찰 제도의 현황과 특징을 파악하고, 대형공공투자사업에 주로 적용되는 최저가낙찰제, 턴키․대안 입찰제도하에서의 가격경쟁효과가 직접적으로 드러나는 낙찰률을 비교․분석하는 것에 의미가 있다. 각 입찰제도의 성과는 경쟁의 행태에 달려 있음을 고려하여 경쟁률과 낙찰률을 중심으로 여러 입찰제도의 입․낙찰 현황을 분석하였다. 1,000억원 이상 사업의 경우 최저가낙찰제하에서 평균 입찰참여자 수는 33.75명, 평균 낙찰률은 61.18%로 나타나, 턴키․대안 입찰제의 평균 입찰참여자 수 2.94명, 평균 낙찰률 90.20%와 큰 차이를 보였다.최저가낙찰제의 경우 규모의 차이를 고려한다 하더라도 낙찰률이 현저히 낮으며, 경쟁의 정도가 심한 것을 확인할 수 있다. 이러한 낙찰률의 차이는 근본적으로 제도의 차이로 해석할 수 있으며, 경쟁의 차이로도 일부 해석할 수 있다. 민간투자사업의 경우, 평균 입찰참여자 수는 1.88명이며, 평균 낙찰률은 90%에 이르고 있어 경쟁 활성화를 통해 효율성을 제고할 여지가 있음을 제시하였다.

English Abstract: This paper considers the effect of various types of procurement auction system on competition focusing on the rate of successful bidding. We analyze the number of bidders and the rate of successful bids using online procurement data of the Public Procurement Service. The average number of bidders is 301 and the average rate of successful bids is 87.42% while the weighted average rate is75.13%. These numbers show that there is quite strong competition among bidders and the rate is lower as the expected price is higher.

When we analyze the data of price procurement auction, the rate is also shown to be lower as the expected price is higher. Furthermore, the rate decreases as the number of bidders increases which naturally makes the competition stronger. Meanwhile, the analysis finds that the inclusion of the onsite bidding, the PQ (Pre-Qualification) result, or major-10 winning companies cannot explain the rate much in our data.

In case of turnkey-alternative, the average rate of successful bidding for 484 cases record 90.20%. The average is 84.89% with 120 alternatives and 91.97% with 364 cases of turnkey. The reason why the rate of turnkey-alternative is lower than that of price procurement auction is the lack of competition as well as the systematic difference.

By setting up a model, we are able to explain the difference in rate caused by the respective reason. When we suppose there are 3 bidders in case of price procurement auction for a project that exceeds 100 billion won, the rate is expected to be around 64%. This implies that difference of 26% is caused by the systemic difference and 3% by the lack of competition. Therefore, we conclude that the difference in rate between turnkey-alternative and price procurement auction is caused mainly by the systemic difference.

In case of PPP (Public Private Partnership) projects, among 154 projects in total, only 40% has more than 2 bidders that compete. The average number of bidders is 1.88 which is less than 2, and the average rate of successful bids is 90%.

In sum, under the price procurement auction, there is strong competition which is reflected by the rate of successful bids. However, there is room to decrease the rate by strengthening the competition under the turnkey-alternative. Also with PPP projects, we expect the rate can be steadily reduced with revived competition among bidders.

Note: Downloadable document is in Korean.

Keywords: 정부조달 (Government Procurement), 경쟁입찰 (Competitive Bidding), 최저가 낙찰제 (Price Procurement Auction), 턴키 (Turnkey), 대안입찰 (Alternative Bidding), 민간투자사업 (Public Private Partnership Projects)

JEL Classification: D44, H54, H41

Suggested Citation

Kim, Jungwook, 공공투자사업의 입·낙찰 분석 (Analysis on Procurement Auction System in Public Procurement Service) (June 30, 2010). KDI Journal of Economic Policy 2010, 32(2) 144-170. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773963

Jungwook Kim (Contact Author)

Korea Development Institute (KDI) ( email )

263 Namsejong-ro
Sejong-si 30149
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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