Agency Conflicts Around the World

59 Pages Posted: 4 May 2016

See all articles by Erwan Morellec

Erwan Morellec

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute

Boris Nikolov

University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Norman Schürhoff

Swiss Finance Institute - HEC Lausanne

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2016

Abstract

We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to quantify agency conflicts across legal and institutional environments and decompose their effects into wealth transfers among stakeholders and value losses from policy distortions. Our estimates show that agency costs are large and vary widely across and within countries. Legal origin and provisions for investor protection affect agency costs, but they are more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally into wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions, the latter being larger where ownership is dispersed. Incentive misalignment captures 60% of country variation in leverage.

Keywords: agency conflicts, Capital Structure, corporate governance, structural estimation

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Morellec, Erwan and Nikolov, Boris and Schürhoff, Norman, Agency Conflicts Around the World (April 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11243, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2774357

Erwan Morellec (Contact Author)

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

College of Management
Extranef Quartier UNIL-Dorigny
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://sfi.epfl.ch/

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

Boris Nikolov

University of Lausanne ( email )

Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Norman Schürhoff

Swiss Finance Institute - HEC Lausanne ( email )

Chavannes-près-Renens
Switzerland

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