Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project

35 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2001

See all articles by Carlo Carraro

Carlo Carraro

Ca' Foscari University of Venice; CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division); IPCC; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; Green Growth Knowledge Platform

Alessandra Pome

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan; University of Turin

Domenico Siniscalco

Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei; University of Turin - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: August 2001

Abstract

This paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate on public vs. private research arising from the genome case, the paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterise some features of an optimal research policy.

Keywords: Science, Technology, Allocation Mechanisms, Intellectual Property Rights, Welfare

JEL Classification: D78, H4, H23, O32, O38

Suggested Citation

Carraro, Carlo and Pome, Alessandra and Siniscalco, Domenico, Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project (August 2001). CESifo Working Paper No. 541; FEEM Working Paper No. 60.2001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=277668 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.277668

Carlo Carraro

Ca' Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
+39 04 1234 9166 (Phone)
+39 04 1234 9176 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.carlocarraro.org/

CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division) ( email )

Via Augusto Imperatore 16
Lecce, 73100
Italy
+39 0832 288650 (Phone)
+39 0832 277603 (Fax)

IPCC ( email )

C/O World Meteorological Organization
7bis Avenue de la Paix
Geneva, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41-22-730-8208/54/84 (Phone)
+41-22-730-8025/13 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

1 Place du Congres
B-1000 Brussels, 1000
Belgium
+32 2 229 3911 (Phone)
+32 2 219 4151 (Fax)

Green Growth Knowledge Platform ( email )

International Environment House
11-13 chemin des Anemones
Geneva, 1219
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/

Alessandra Pome

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan ( email )

Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milan
Italy
+39 02 5203 6941 (Phone)
+39 02 5203 6946 (Fax)

University of Turin

Via Po 53
I-10122 Turin, Turin - Piedmont 10100
Italy

Domenico Siniscalco (Contact Author)

Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy ( email )

Via XX Settembre 97
Rome, Rome 00187
Italy

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ( email )

Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milan
Italy
+39 02 5203 6942 (Phone)
+39 02 5203 6946 (Fax)

University of Turin - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Po, 53
Torino, 10124
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
264
Abstract Views
2,532
rank
165,116
PlumX Metrics