Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

41 Pages Posted: 9 May 2016 Last revised: 14 Jun 2016

See all articles by Astrid Gamba

Astrid Gamba

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF

Date Written: May 6, 2016

Abstract

When Legislators award amnesties to ‘low-rank’ criminals cooperating with the justice, top criminals may capture public officials to avoid being sanctioned. Optimal policies should anticipate this danger and fight it back by granting amnesties not only to low-rank criminals, but also to officials who plea guilty and report bribe givers. Even if the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to bribe prosecutors, these policies increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminals but also for low-rank ones, whereby increasing the risk premium that they require to participate in the crime. This domino effect can deter crime more than a policy based only on amnesties to low-rank criminals would: the bright side of subversion of law.

Keywords: Criminal Organizations, Corruption, Leniency

JEL Classification: K14, K42, D73, D78

Suggested Citation

Gamba, Astrid and Immordino, Giovanni and Piccolo, Salvatore, Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law (May 6, 2016). University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 336, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2776762 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776762

Astrid Gamba (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Giovanni Immordino

University of Salerno - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy

Salvatore Piccolo

University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF ( email )

via de caniana 2
24127
Bergamo, BG 24127
Italy

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