De Viti De Marco vs. Ricardo on Public Debt: Self Extinction or Default?

21 Pages Posted: 7 May 2016

See all articles by Giuseppe Eusepi

Giuseppe Eusepi

Sapienza University of Rome

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: May 7, 2016

Abstract

The most prominent Italian theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. Despite this common point of analytical departure, their theories of public debt diverged sharply. In this divergence, moreover, lies a fundamental gulf between two distinct analytical schemes for connecting the micro and macro levels of analysis. Ricardo treated macro aggregates as analytical primitives, with individual action being induced from those aggregates. In sharp contrast, de Viti took individual variables as primitive, with aggregate conditions being induced from interaction among those individual variables. Within de Viti’s framework of a fully cooperative state, public debt would be self-extinguishing. De Viti also recognized that democracies were never exclusively cooperative, as continuing competition among elites striving for power would enable politically dominant groups to pass cost onto the remainder of society, thereby operating as a de facto form of default.

Keywords: Ricardian equivalence; debt default; micro foundations of macro; circulation of elites; capital budgeting

JEL Classification: B31, D72, H63

Suggested Citation

Eusepi, Giuseppe and Wagner, Richard E., De Viti De Marco vs. Ricardo on Public Debt: Self Extinction or Default? (May 7, 2016). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 16-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2776984 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776984

Giuseppe Eusepi

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

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Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rwagner/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/richard-wagner

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