Coordination, Inclusiveness and Wage Inequality between Median and Bottom Income Workers

Comparative European Politics, (Forthcoming)

45 Pages Posted: 16 May 2016

See all articles by Tim Vlandas

Tim Vlandas

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - European Institute

Date Written: May 8, 2016

Abstract

What explains cross-national variation in wage inequality? Research in comparative political economy stresses the importance of the welfare state and wage coordination in reducing not only disposable income inequality but also gross earnings inequality. However, the cross-national variation in gross earnings inequality between median and low income workers is at odds with this conventional wisdom: the German coordinated market economy is now more unequal in this type of inequality than the UK, a liberal market economy. To solve this puzzle, I argue that non-inclusive coordination benefits median but not bottom income workers and is as a result associated with higher - rather than lower - wage inequality. I find support for this argument using a large N quantitative analysis of wage inequality in a panel of Western European countries. Results are robust to the inclusion of numerous controls, country fixed effects, and also hold with a sample of OECD countries. Taken together these findings force us to reconsider the relationship between coordination and wage inequality at the bottom of the income distribution.

Keywords: varieties of capitalism, labour market institutions, wage inequality, wage coordination, welfare state, union density

JEL Classification: P16, J31, J38, J50, J51, H53

Suggested Citation

Vlandas, Tim, Coordination, Inclusiveness and Wage Inequality between Median and Bottom Income Workers (May 8, 2016). Comparative European Politics, (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777133

Tim Vlandas (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - European Institute

Oxford, Oxfordshire OX2
United Kingdom

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