Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants

47 Pages Posted: 9 May 2016 Last revised: 30 Sep 2022

See all articles by Alessandra Casella

Alessandra Casella

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jean Francois Laslier

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2016

Abstract

In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects deviating from equilibrium strategies. Because subjects understand the logic of the game — minority voters must concentrate votes unpredictably — the exact choices are of secondary importance, a result that vouches for the robustness of the voting rule to strategic mistakes.

Suggested Citation

Casella, Alessandra and Laslier, Jean Francois and Macé, Antonin, Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants (May 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22231, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777319

Alessandra Casella (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~ac186/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Jean Francois Laslier

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

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Paris, 75014 75014
France

Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS ( email )

France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/antoninmace/home

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