Winner Determination in Geometrical Combinatorial Auctions

25 Pages Posted: 10 May 2016

See all articles by Bart Vangerven

Bart Vangerven

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)

Dries Goossens

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)

Frits Spieksma

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)

Date Written: April 27, 2016

Abstract

We consider auctions of items that can be arranged in rows. Examples of such a setting appear in allocating pieces of land for real estate development, or seats in a theater or stadium. The objective is, given bids on subsets of items, to find a subset of bids that maximizes auction revenue (often referred to as the winner determination problem). We describe a dynamic programming algorithm which, for a k-row problem with connected and gap-free bids, solves the winner determination problem in polynomial time. We study the complexity for bids in a grid, complementing known results in literature. Additionally, we study variants of the geometrical winner determination setting. We provide a NP-hardness proof for the 2-row setting with gap-free bids. Finally, we extend this dynamic programming algorithm to solve the case where bidders submit connected, but not necessarily gap-free bids in a 2-row and a 3-row problem.

Suggested Citation

Vangerven, Bart and Goossens, Dries and Spieksma, Frits, Winner Determination in Geometrical Combinatorial Auctions (April 27, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777489 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2777489

Bart Vangerven (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Dries Goossens

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Frits Spieksma

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

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